toc military meaning

Toc Military Meaning - Imagine you have a 24-hour shift working in the office of a small military team. You are on TOC duty. The abbreviation "TOC" stands for Tactical Operations Center. The headquarters are made up of specially trained officers or military personnel who guide element members during their mission. The shift usually lasts from 7 am to 7 pm. In addition to filling coolers with ice, placing guides outside and filling water, the TOC person keeps the work area clean and tidy. If someone needs help with side quests, someone will help.

After all the main quests are completed, you can do whatever you want at the table. I watch movies at certain hours, call home at other times, surf the Internet or write occasionally (as I am now). This job can be compared to a receptionist. Other soldiers on a TOC mission bring their computers to play games, throw movies on the projector or just play games on their phones. Some individuals are artists and may spend most of their time drawing. It depens on you! As long as everything is square.

Toc Military Meaning

Fortunately, once or twice a month, I was recruited to TOC. Why am I looking forward to a 24-hour shift, you ask? Because I have a day off! No complaints there.

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Conversely, the task of TOC should not be confused with CK (quarter change). The people in "CK" guard the barracks where the soldiers live and make sure everything is safe.

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Six-year U.S. Army Sergeant ▫Writing about life lessons, entrepreneurship, content creation, social media marketing, wellness and personal growth 🇵🇭🇬🇺 talks about how the military adapts its position to the current operational environment. New regional threats such as Iran, North Korea and Russia require the military to shift its focus from counter-insurgency to large-scale combat operations. At the same time, the character of the war turns into multi-area warfare, including land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Given these convergence changes, the US's next war will be far more dynamic and complex than the counter-insurgency and stabilization operations in which it has been heavily involved for more than fifteen years. This reality creates new problems and demands for the intelligence warfare function and requires intelligence professionals to develop the skills necessary to meet these demands and to abandon the concepts, habits and standard operating procedures they have learned and applied during this period.

Argues that today's threat landscape requires a force to transition from being prepared to suppress rebellion to being prepared for great power conflict. To understand what this transition means for intelligence, it would be helpful to first examine counter-insurgency operations, and specifically how intelligence works in these operations.

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In riot suppression, the insurgent threat has limited ground warfare capabilities and little or no capability in other areas. As strategist Bill Dries argues, US dominance in counterinsurgency (and counter-terrorism) allows for highly centralized and controlled war planning and combat: combat commanders plan, assign, and execute operations using functional components. The United States is able to maneuver its joint forces largely unchallenged. As Dries wrote, "With the Air Force and Navy providing air superiority, naval superiority, theater-wide awareness and long-range communications, Army and Marine Corps forces enter and maneuver freely within the theater."

US counterinsurgency operations focus on clearing specific threat areas while training and assisting local security forces. These protracted conflicts may require incredible perseverance, but require little adjustment in terms of friendly forces. Therefore, the processes are highly cyclical. Distributions are scheduled regularly. Missions are executed from static, empowered bases. This does not mean that counterinsurgency is easy. Limited success in Afghanistan and Iraq also shows the opposite. Instead, the extraordinary complexity of counterinsurgency lies in the political rather than the military question—finding a way to legitimize another government as a third-party actor.

The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in riot suppression is based on the characteristics of the counterinsurgency described above. Therefore, the IPB process is largely population-driven. Battlefield analysis focuses on people, not terrain. As stated in the Army's Counter-Insurgency Manual FM 3-24, “IPB in COIN Operations . . . It puts more emphasis on the civilian aspects, especially the people and leaders in the AO [on the field], than the IPB does for conventional operations.” Description and description of the operational environment focuses heavily on PMESII-PT factors (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and weather). Staff analyze and understand the characteristics of the battlefield as well as its characteristics such as demographics, culture, tribes and clans. Counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen pointed out that counterinsurgency stresses the importance of understanding the political and cultural factors of the operational environment, and suggested that counter-insurgents "become world experts" on PMESII-PT factors in their field.

IPB is also cyclical in suppressing insurgency. Determining the direction of movement of threats is relatively repetitive. The threat's limited military capabilities limit its potential plans of action. While the exact time, location, and target of an attack may vary, the range of possible attack types generally does not.

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Noting that intelligence guides the process, he defines targeting as "cutting off cancerous tissue while leaving other vital organs intact." As a result, intelligence personnel are extensively trained in targeting processes such as D3A (decision, detection, delivery and evaluation) and F3EAD (find, correct, terminate, exploit, analyze and deploy). Intelligence professionals have become experts at researching personalities, mapping insurgent networks, and designing intelligence-gathering plans that allow for kinetic "termination" of operations. This training and practice is largely specific to counter-insurgency operations and has limited application for large-scale combat operations.

Counterinsurgency makes heavy use of two types of intelligence. First, it requires a strong use of human intelligence. Many pointed out that interaction with local people is key to painting the human landscape. As a result, the military has invested heavily in HUMINT assets such as cultural support teams. Targeting operations emphasize non-lethal methods so that foragers can gain access to a target and examine it for more information about the threat network.

Second, intelligence during counter-insurgency operations has also proven important in the targeting process. SIGINT is used to take advantage of the enemy's digital and electronic footprint and is particularly critical in the "find" and "fix" parts of the D3A.

Another important feature of the suppression operation is the unprecedented degree of inter-agency cooperation and collaboration. In counter-insurgency operations, there is significant visibility and access to information across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. This means that intelligence personnel can benefit from a large number of products and assets that are usually reserved for, or at least primarily intended for, the operational or strategic level, even when operating at the tactical level. For example, the S2 battalion has access to products manufactured by civilian intelligence agencies. Similarly, if a unit makes contact, higher headquarters can immediately reallocate resources to assist them.

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In an environment of suppression, the United States has dominance in all areas. The threat has no ability to invade US units. US forces enter the operation zone safely; they often break into equipment, procedures and products already in the theatre; and other units relax relatively easily. Soldiers usually know when to deploy. In the case of a large-scale war, neither of these would likely be true.

Instead, it has a recognizable, coherent problem and solution that greatly reduces the complexity of counterinsurgency warfare. This becomes especially clear when compared with the complexity of combat intelligence personnel in major combat operations.

The character of large-scale combat operations differs significantly from that of counter-insurgency operations. Most of the differences stem from the stark contrast in abilities between a rebel and a peer or peer threat. These threats have the ability to compete with the United States on land, sea and air; The United States does not have the dominance as in the counter-guerrilla. As a result, the battlefields of major operations are as good as new.

He describes them as "more chaotic, intense, and utterly destructive than the military has experienced in the past few decades." For example, modern or close peers like Russia could potentially hack their intelligence systems. The threat may also prevent American and friendly forces from collecting full motion video footage of deep combat; this is a capability the United States has in counterinsurgency with a wide variety of surveillance drones (what retired General Stanley McChrystal famously called the "eye"). cannot flash". "

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Both threat and friendly targets differ greatly between counter-insurgency and large-scale combat. As mentioned above, population-based counterinsurgency operations aim to break the enemy's will by consuming (i.e. targeting) the enemy's forces and consuming its primary resource, popular support. Large-scale combat aims primarily at breaking the enemy's will by exhausting the enemy's forces and gaining territory, denying the threat any ground advantage.

First, the IPB process should focus on terrain and threat impacts, not population. This means that HUMINT collections are like retention operations.

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